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Meaningful and More Meaningful 
A Modest Measure  
Peter Baumann* 
 
Abstract 
We often describe lives (or parts of lives) as meaningful or as not meaningful. It is also common to 
characterize them as more or less meaningful. Some lives, we tend to think, are more meaningful 
than others. But how then can one compare lives with respect to how much meaning they contain? 
Can one? This paper argues that (i) only a notion of rough equality can be used when comparing 
different lives with respect to their meaning, and that (ii) the relation of being more meaningful is 
not transitive. It follows that all attempts to rank different lives in terms of meaning can at best lead 
to partially indeterminate and incomplete rankings. One should also give up on the idea of 
“maximizing” meaning. I will use Thaddeus Metz’s important recent book Meaning in Life. An 
Analytic Study as a foil for my discussion.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
We often describe lives (or parts of lives) as meaningful or as not 
meaningful.1 It is also common to characterize them as more or less meaningful. 
Some lives, we tend to think, are more meaningful than others. For instance, in 
his important recent book Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study Thaddeus Metz 
puts his basic claim in the following way: “A human person’s life is more 
meaningful, the more that she employs her reason and in ways that positively 
orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence.”2 This 
remark implies that there are degrees of meaningfulness, as Metz confirms in 
other parts of his book.3 According to him there is intrapersonal comparability 
of meaning: “... the goods of pleasure and meaning can be ordered in the sense 
that some parts of a life are more pleasant and more meaningful than others.”4 
Metz adds a claim of intrapersonal aggregation: “… it appears that pleasure and 
                                                     
* Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Swarthmore College, 500 College Avenue, 
Swarthmore, PA 19081, USA. Email: pbauman1[a]swarthmore.edu 
1 See for overviews on the recent discussion about the meaning of life: Metz 2002, 2007 and 2008. 
2 Metz 2013, 222; see also, with more detail, 233 and 235; see also, e.g., Joske 2000, 290-294; 
Schmidtz 2001, 172; Mawson 2010; Kauppinen 2013. 
3 Metz 2013, 4, passim.  
4 Metz 2013, 63.  
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meaning are intrapersonally aggregative, i.e., are amenable to rough judgments 
of how much of these goods there are in a given life overall. … Given these 
kinds of roughly cardinal measurements of particular times in a life, one could 
conceivably add them up to inform an estimation of whether the life has enough 
pleasure in it to count as pleasant overall or period. Similar kinds of claims 
apply to meaning, even supposing … that it can include whole-life elements.” 5 
Finally, Metz goes even one step further and accepts the claim of interpersonal 
comparability: “… pleasure and meaning appear to be interpersonally 
comparative, which means that we can compare different lives with regard to 
amounts of these goods. For all I know, my life is, so far, more pleasurable than 
Emily Dickinson’s was, but less meaningful than Albert Einstein’s.” 6 Even if 
one does not interpret Metz – and there is no reason to do so – as saying that we 
can measure meaning by counting “units” of meaning and then adding up the 
units, he is still making a very strong claim here: that meanings can be compared 
across persons.7 There has been and still is a long and controversial discussion 
in economics about the possibility of interpersonal comparison of utility,8 and 
analogous claims about meaning deserve much more scrutiny than they seem to 
have deserved so far.  
How then can one compare and rank lives with respect to how much 
meaning they contain? Can one? I will argue that Metz’ strong claims about 
comparability and rankability of meaningfulness cannot be upheld. 
 
2. Incomparability or Indeterminate Rankings 
 
It is tempting to take one’s lead from value theory and the orthodox view 
that there can be exactly three comparative evaluative relations between any two 
evaluated items A and B: A being better than B or A being worse than B or A and 
B being equally good. Similarly, one could assume that there are exactly three 
ways in which any two lives (or parts of lives; from now on I will focus on 
whole lives) can compare with respect to meaning: One life could be more 
meaningful than or less meaningful than or equally meaningful as the other life. 
Different lives (or parts thereof) are comparable with respect to meaningfulness 
                                                     
5 Metz 2013, 63.  
6 Metz 2013, 63.  
7 See also Metz 2013, 39-40, 158, 236. 
8 Robbins 1938 is one of the classic contributions to this debate. 
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– where comparability is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation.9 I take it 
that Metz adheres to this orthodox view: Even though he does not seem to say so 
explicitly, there is no trace of adherence to any of the alternative views discussed 
below (which are the main options I can think of). Is this the correct way to look 
at lives, meaning and meaningful lives? 
Two ideas should be put aside from the start. First, there is no common scale 
on which different lives can be measured and compared with respect to their 
meaning. The attribution of meaning to lives is in this respect not like the 
attribution of length to material objects. In a certain sense of the word 
“incommensurable” – one in which commensurability requires a common scale 
– lives are incommensurable. However, this does not mean they are 
incomparable. To be sure, Metz sometimes talks of “scales” when he talks about 
comparisons of meaningfulness10; however, as already pointed out above, there 
is no reason to take this in the very strong sense of a ratio scale which would 
allow the counting and adding up of units (like, e.g., in the case of length 
measurements). – Second, there is only so much “precision” in comparisons 
between lives (with respect to their meanings). There is certainly some amount 
of vagueness but also a certain roughness of the degree of granularity of 
comparison. But this alone does not speak against the possibility of comparison. 
Comparison need not be ideally “precise” (more on this below).11 
So, is it true that for any two lives either one is more meaningful than the 
other or they are (roughly) equally meaningful? Consider the life of Picasso and 
the life of Euclid (or, alternatively, Einstein and Dickinson). Is one more 
meaningful than the other? It seems we are at a loss if we try to answer this 
question in the positive; the question is even somewhat suspicious and might 
involve basic misunderstandings. Should we then rather judge that Picasso’s life 
and Euclid’s life are equally meaningful (roughly)? To deal with this latter 
question, consider a third life, the life of a painter which was not quite as 
glorious and meaningful as Picasso’s but still pretty meaningful. We would say 
that in that case Picasso’s life was more meaningful than the other painter’s life. 
If Picasso’s and Euclid’s lives were equally meaningful, then it seems that we 
should also say that Euclid’s life was more meaningful than the other painter’s 
                                                     
9 Given any three relata x, y and z: x is comparable to itself; if x is comparable to y, then y is 
comparable to x; if x is comparable to y and y to z, then x is also comparable to z. 
10 See, e.g., Metz 2013, 63-64. 
11 See also Metz 2013, 63 where he talks about “rough” aggregation. I take him to mean lack of 
precision as mentioned in the text above.  
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life (if P=E & if P>O, then E>O). But this judgment seems as problematic as the 
judgment about Picasso’s and Euclid’s lives. Should we then conclude that 
Picasso’s and Euclid’s lives are incomparable with respect to meaning because 
neither is more meaningful than the other nor are they equally meaningful?12 
This suggestion can be understood in more than one way. First, as the idea 
of incomparability in the strict sense: Some lives can in principle not be 
compared with each other (with respect to meaning) because neither is one more 
meaningful than the other nor are they equally good, and there are only these 
three possibilities: quartum non datur. Incomparability in this sense amounts to 
an analogue of the failure of completeness of the better than-relation.13 
Second, there is the idea that quartum datur: that there is a fourth 
comparative relation besides more, less or equally meaningful. One could call it 
“in the same league (as far as meaning is concerned)”.14 If two lives are in the 
same league, then neither is one more meaningful than the other nor are they 
equally meaningful. They are not comparable in the sense allowed for by the 
first, orthodox, view. But according to this second, less orthodox view they still 
can be compared with each other: Being in the same league is a relation sui 
generis.  
Third, there is the idea of indeterminacy and truth-value gaps. Not only is it 
not true (as in the case of incomparability) that Picasso’s life is more meaningful 
than or less meaningful than or as meaningful as Euclid’s life but it is also not 
false that Picasso’s life is more meaningful than or less meaningful than or as 
meaningful as Euclid’s life. 15  It is simply indeterminate how some lives 
compare with respect to meaning (more on this below).  
The first idea, the idea of strict incomparability (a relation which is 
irreflexive, symmetric and not transitive), is not easy to understand: Why should 
it not be possible to compare two lives with respect to meaning, especially since 
not all lives would be incomparable? One might suspect that Picasso’s life was 
too different from Euclid’s life to be comparable. But why should the “size” of 
the difference matter? And how do we determine size of the difference anyway? 
                                                     
12 See for this type of idea as applied to the better than-relation or the relation of strict preference: Raz 
1985/86, 121; Raz 1986, 325-326, and Chang 1997. 
13 See, e.g., Luce & Raiffa 1957, 23, 25; Sen 1985, 177-181; see also von Neumann & Morgenstern 
1953, 26. 
14 See for the analogue in the case of value relations, e.g., Chang 1997, 25-27 and Chang 2002; Chang 
uses the terms “parity” and “on a par”. 
15 See Broome 1997 for the parallel case of the better than-relation. 
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There do not seem to be answers available to these questions. As long as there 
aren’t convincing answers one should remain skeptical of the idea of meaning 
incomparability (I don’t want to argue so much against this view but rather 
propose and defend an alternative view here).  
The third idea, though apparently more radical than the first one (not only is 
it not true to state certain comparative relations but it is also not false), seems to 
make more sense. There does not seem to be a good reason to think that our 
notion of meaning is so much “spelled out” that it would allow for a verdict 
about comparative meaning in every actual or even possible case. One should 
rather expect the notion of meaning to be somewhat “open” in the sense that its 
criteria of application do not determine a verdict in all possible or even actual 
cases.16 
Some examples and cases from the more recent discussion of personal 
identity, for instance, are so far-fetched that one is tempted to say that our 
ordinary notion of personhood is not “built” for these kinds of cases and does 
not allow for a verdict about personal identity through time.17 Similarly in the 
case of meaning: This notion, one could suspect, is not “built” for applications to 
cases like the Euclid-Picasso case; it would be too much to expect that the 
notion determines a verdict in such cases. For instance, one major problem is 
that one would have to weigh different criteria against each other and the notion 
of meaning might not determine how to do that.18 Indeterminacy, openness and 
vagueness seem ineliminable. However, this third view is compatible with the 
orthodox view that there are exactly three comparative relations; it is just a 
general claim about the semantics of the relevant notions, not a metaphysical 
claim about what relations there are. So, this third view is not in competition 
with the other views.  
As far as substantial ideas concerning comparative relations are concerned, 
this seems to leave us with the second idea, the idea of there being a fourth 
relation of being in the same league. Applied to the example above, we get the 
verdict that even though Picasso’s life and Euclid’s life are not equally 
meaningful and even though it is also not the case that one is more meaningful 
than the other, they are in the same league with each other. The life of “the other 
                                                     
16 See for semantic openness in general, e.g., Waismann 1945, 121-126, and, more recently, Ludlow 
2006. 
17 See, for instance, Parfit 1984, part 3. 
18 See Mawson 2010 who emphasizes this point. 
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painter” could also be in the same league with Euclid’s life – even though 
Picasso’s life and the other painter’s life are not in the same league (in the sense 
of the word as used here: being in the same league with some X rules out 
standing in one of the other comparative relations with X) but the former is more 
meaningful than the latter. The relation of being in the same league is reflexive 
(because every life is exactly as meaningful as itself), symmetric (consider 
Picasso and Euclid) and not transitive (the other painter’s life is in the same 
league with Euclid’s life and Euclid’s life is in the same league with Picasso’s 
life but Picasso’s life is not in the same league with the other painter’s life). The 
set of lives with which a given life is in the same league are “centered” in the 
following sense: Every life has its own set of lives with which it is in the same 
league, and typically some of the other lives in the set have a different such set 
of their own.  
However, there is another and even better way of describing the relation 
between Picasso’s and Euclid’s life. Instead of saying that they are in the same 
league as far as meaning is concerned one could rather say that they are equally 
meaningful. This might seem very puzzling or implausible at first, given the 
remarks above, but this impression changes quickly if one reminds oneself of 
the relativity to varying degrees of granularity (or standards of precision) which 
characterizes at least many judgments of equality.19 
Consider measurements of the length of ordinary objects. It might be true to 
say of two boards for a bookshelf that they are equally long, say, e.g., both 1 
meter long. This is, however, compatible with the one being one millimeter 
longer than the other. There is no contradiction here if (as seems plausible) the 
following is true. When we say of the two boards that they are “equally long” 
we use the term “equally long” with a certain not too fine degree of granularity 
(1 centimeter difference counts but we’re neglecting anything less than half a 
centimeter difference). If we wanted to be pedantic we could indicate the degree 
of granularity db (or the standard of precision sb) and use the term “equally 
longdb” (or “equally longsb”) instead.  
In other judgments of length different degrees and standards are in force. A 
watchmaker might truly say that one replacement piece for a watch is equally 
long as the original piece, namely .3 centimeters. This is compatible with one of 
the pieces being a tenth of a millimeter longer than the other. Again, there is no 
                                                     
19 See, for a related idea and one concerning value relations, Benbaji 2009. 
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contradiction if the watchmaker is using the term “equally long” with a 
somewhat finer but not excessively fine degree of granularity or standard of 
precision (half a millimeter does not count but one millimeter counts). Again, if 
we wanted to be pedantic we could say that the watchmaker is not using the 
above notion of being equally longdb but rather the notion of being equally 
longdw. Judgments of equality show this implicit relativity to varying degrees of 
granularity. The idea of perfect precision does not even seem to make any sense: 
The notion of being equally long, as applied to ordinary objects, loses its sense 
when we go down to the scale of nanometers; at this order of “magnitude” the 
notion of length is not defined anymore for ordinary objects. One might be 
tempted to think that the expression “equally long” thus invites a contextualist 
semantics according to which speakers in different contexts of use might mean 
different things when they use this term, depending on the relevant degree of 
granularity.20 
Something similar happens with our judgments about lives being “equally 
meaningful”. When we compare Euclid’s life with Picasso’s life and judge that 
their lives are equally meaningful we use a very rough degree of granularity. We 
think about them as extraordinarily creative people in general who have made an 
important contribution. However, when we compare Picasso’s life with the other 
painter’s life we do in addition think of them as painters, perhaps even as 
painters of the same period. Our degree of granularity is much finer here. There 
is a hidden relativity to degrees of granularity in our judgments of equality of 
meaning (of lives). Judgments of equality (of meaning), again, might invite a 
contextualist semantics according to which different pairs of lives trigger 
different degrees of granularity for judgments of equality (of meaning). This 
notion of “relative” equality is different from the orthodox notion of “strict” 
equality (see above). Both relations are reflexive and symmetric but strict 
equality is transitive while relative equality isn’t.21 
Insofar as this context-sensitivity and relativity is implicit and thus hidden, 
we can easily get puzzled or even confused when thinking about and comparing 
different lives with each other with respect to meaning, like the lives of Picasso, 
                                                     
20 See, e.g., Stojanovic 2008 for the basic semantic options; see also Benbaji 2009, 325-327; I won’t 
pursue such semantic questions here. 
21 Assume that stick I is 9.5 inches long, stick II 8.8 inches long and stick III 8 inches long. Given a 
relation of being equally longstick with a degree of granularity or precision which does not distinguish 
between differences smaller than 1 inch, we would have to say that I is equally longstick as II and II is 
equally longstick as III but that I is not equally longstick as III (but longerstick than III). 
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Euclid and the other painter. As we go from one comparison (Euclid – Picasso) 
to another (Picasso – the other painter) we change the degree of granularity and 
switch to a more fine grained notion of equality; as we go from the latter 
comparison to the third one (the other painter – Picasso) we return to a rougher 
degree of granularity and a less fine grained notion of granularity. Each such 
notion of equality is reflexive, symmetric and not transitive. However, the 
problem is that we’re using different notions of equality for different 
comparisons of meaning.  
One could argue that the case of being in the same league (see above) 
collapses into the case of equality of a given degree of granularity. If this should 
turn out not to be so and if being in the same league is not the same as being 
equal given a certain degree of granularity, then I would have problems 
understanding what could be meant by “being in the same league”. What makes 
a lot of sense, however, is the granularity-relative notion of equality.  
However, there is a price to pay: Things are in some respects more 
complicated with “relative” equality, as we could call this, than with 
“non-relative” equality. If the degree of granularity for the notion of being 
equally meaningful is rougher (or more fine-grained), then the degree of 
granularity for the notion of being more meaningful is also rougher (or more 
fine-grained). There is then not just one ranking of lives with respect to meaning 
but several which differ as to the degree of granularity. Consider a rougher 
ranking and a finer-grained ranking of lives with respect to meaning. Even if all 
the lives considered should have a definite position in the rougher ranking (e.g., 
Picasso, Euclid, the other painter and some others all equally high up while 
some others have less meaningful lives and still others perhaps even more 
meaningful lives; the position in the ranking would be determined by all the 
relations between the different lives), they might not all have a definite place in 
the more fine-grained ranking. For instance, while Picasso’s life is, according to 
our example, more meaningful than the other painter’s life it is not clear where 
Euclid’s life is located on the finer-grained ranking: above, below or at the side 
of Picasso or the other painter. Some more fine-grained rankings will thus be 
“incomplete” in the sense that for some pairs of lives it will be indeterminate 
whether the one life is more meaningful (given the relevant degree of 
granularity) than the other or equally meaningful (again, given the relevant 
degree of granularity) as the other. There can be an interval of locations on the 
finer-grained ranking but no precise location. Indeterminacy (see above) comes 
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into play here.  
One interesting implication of all this is that even though rankings of lives 
are still possible they will be limited given certain degrees of granularity (or 
standards of precision). The above remarks suggest that there are some uses of 
“more meaningful”, “less meaningful” and “equally meaningful” which do not 
allow for complete ranking of lives. This does, however, not mean that no or 
only very few comparisons of lives with respect to meaning are possible but 
only that there is a certain element of indeterminacy involved here. If one does 
not acknowledge this, one risks falling for misleading and overstretched ideas 
about comparing and ranking lives with respect to meaning. 
All this goes against Metz’ much more “orthodox” views22 according to 
which parts of lives allow for both intra- and interpersonal comparison and 
whole lives for interpersonal comparison. These kinds of comparisons are 
supposed to allow even for some kind of additive aggregation of meaning. 
Given the remarks above, this kind of “measurement” of meaningfulness just 
isn’t possible. I do not see this at all as a reason to reject Metz’ view on meaning 
as a whole; rather one would have to modify it in certain ways in order to take 
into account the element of indeterminacy and the relativity to granularity in our 
judgments about comparative meaningfulness.  
 
3. Non-Transitivity and Collapses of Rankings 
 
If several items have determinate positions on some ranking and if item A is 
higher up on the ranking then item B while item B is higher up on the ranking 
than item C, then item A has to be higher up on that ranking than item C. This is 
due to the transitivity of the relation of being higher up on some ranking. This 
much seems pretty uncontroversial. However, it is not so clear whether we 
should think that lives can be ranked in such a way that there are more 
meaningful lives higher up and less meaningful lives lower down on the ranking. 
This kind of ranking requires transitivity but the crucial question is whether the 
relation of being a more meaningful life (or a less meaningful life) is transitive.23 
Is it? It seems that Metz is committed to a positive answer; I see no hints in his 
                                                     
22 See, again, Metz 2013, 222, 233 and 235; see also 39-40, 63-64, 158, and 236. 
23 For the role of the assumption of transitivity of strict preference or of the better than-relation in 
classical decision theory see Ramsey 1990, 78, 75; von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953, 26; Savage 
1972, 18, 21. 
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work to doubts concerning transitivity. 
Consider three lives (more precisely: very partial sketches of three lives) and 
let us make the very plausible assumption that more than one factor contributes 
to the meaning of a life.24 For instance, as one factor to be considered here we 
can choose engagement with personal projects of value.25 As the second factor 
to be considered here we can choose the making of positive contributions to the 
lives of others.26 If one does not agree that these two factors contribute to 
meaning one can easily replace them by others – these kinds of details don’t 
matter here. Metz himself advocates a family resemblance view about the notion 
of a meaningful life and mentions three different aspects of meaning in passing: 
purposiveness, transcendence and esteem.27 
The two factors just mentioned are not completely independent from each 
other and they do often overlap; however, all that is needed here is the realistic 
assumption that one factor cannot be reduced to the other and that they can vary 
against each other. Suppose for example that a chess player has had a life rich of 
engagement with the playing of the wonderful game of chess but that he has not 
made that much of a positive contribution to the lives of others. Compare this 
first chess player’s life with the life of a second chess player who hasn’t gotten 
quite as much out of playing the game as the first chess player but has made 
more of a contribution to the lives of others because he taught little children how 
to play the game. Finally, consider the life of a third chess player who was not as 
engaged with the game as the other two but who started a very successful social 
program in troubled neighborhoods of his home town which would bring the 
game to teenagers and thus keep them off the streets and give them some 
perspective which they would otherwise have lacked. Suppose for the sake of 
the example that this is all that matters to the meaning of these lives.  
It might then well be that the first chess player’s life is more meaningful 
overall than the second chess player’s life: Even though the second had a bit 
                                                     
24 See in general Mawson 2010. 
25 See, e.g., Schlick 1979; Taylor 1981, 1987, 1999, and 2000; Nozick 1981, 610-619; Sylvan & 
Griffin 1982; Bennett 1984; Kekes 1986 and 2000; Wisdom 1987; Teichman 1993; Wolf 1997a, 1997b, 
2007 and 2010; Joske 2000; Schmidtz 2001; Thomson 2003, esp. ch.4; Cottingham 2003; Audi 2005, 
333-334; Levi 2005; Thagard 2010; Metz 2011 and 2013; Smuts 2013; Kauppinnen 2012 and 2013; 
see Wong 2008 on the value of identities; see also in general Wiggins 1987 and Hare 2000. 
26 See, e.g., Cottingham 2003; Audi 2005, 333-334; Kernohan 2006, 135; Wolf 2010; Smuts 2013; on 
whether morality and certain relations towards others are necessary or sufficient for or contributory to 
meaning see: Dahl 1987; Wolf 1997b and 2010; Thomas 2005; Landau 2011; Smuts 2013. 
27 See Metz 2013, 34-35. 
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more of a positive social impact, this is more than compensated for by the richer 
engagement with the game that the first chess player had. Similarly for the 
comparison between the overall meaning in the second chess player’s life and in 
the third chess player’s life: Even though the third player has made more of a 
positive contribution to the lives of others, the second player still got so much 
more out of the game than the third player, – so much more that overall the 
second player’s life would count as more meaningful than the third player’s life. 
But now compare the first chess player’s life with the third chess player’s life. 
The alleged transitivity of being more meaningful would ensure, given our 
assumptions, that the first chess player’s life is also more meaningful overall 
than the third chess player’s life.  
However, there is a significant problem here. It might well be that the 
difference between the contribution to the lives of others that the third player has 
made is not just bigger than the first player’s contribution; apart from that, it 
might also cross a “threshold” such that the difference of contribution between 
the first player’s life and the third player’s life weighs more than some 
“aggregative sum” of the difference of contribution between the first player’s 
life and the second player’s life and the difference of contribution between the 
second player’s life and the third player’s life. When one compares the first with 
the third player, the dimension of the contribution to the lives of others counts so 
much and weighs so heavily that it outweighs the difference between the 
respective quality of their engagement with the game. Hence, under such 
conditions we should judge that the third chess player’s life is more meaningful 
than the first chess player’s life.  
Hence, we have a lack of transitivity for the relation of being a more 
meaningful life overall. This failure of transitivity – which is not the same as 
intransitivity (if life A is more meaningful than life B and life B more 
meaningful than life C, then life A is not more meaningful (or even less 
meaningful) than life C) – can be explained in a formal way. There are two 
independent criteria or factors and at least one of them (here the contribution 
factor) is “non-linear” in the sense that there are thresholds of importance like 
the one mentioned above built into it. Structurally similar phenomena are 
well-known from the area of human preferences.28 I might prefer car B to car A 
because B has some nice extras for a bit (but not too much) more money. 
                                                     
28 See Tversky 1969; Fishburn 1991; the discussion between Hughes 1980, Lee 1984, Philips 1989 
and Rawling 1990 as well as, more recently, Temkin 2012. 
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Similarly, I might prefer car C to car B because C has some further nice extras 
for another additional (but not too substantial) amount of money. However, I 
might not prefer C to A and rather prefer A to C because now the difference in 
price has passed some threshold and outweighs the niceties of the additional 
extras.  
A similar point and argument can be made for the relation (whatever the 
degree of granularity) of being an equally meaningful life overall; I won’t go 
through the parallels here. The overall conclusion here is that both more 
meaningful and equally meaningful fail transitivity. For the sake of simplicity, I 
have focused on the first relation here. Given the complexities of life, it is very 
plausible to assume that non-transitive cycles of lives like in our example above 
are pervasive. It doesn’t happen all the time but often enough to raise serious 
questions about the possibility of ranking lives in terms of their “amount” of 
meaning. Without transitivity there is no ranking. Even though this kind of 
failure of transitivity does not entail incomparability (see above) between any 
two lives, it implies that there cannot be complete determinate rankings of lives 
with respect to their meaning (even given some fixed degree of granularity). In 
other words, even though there can be more “local” (perhaps “regional”) 
comparisons there can be no “global” rankings.  
In his book, Metz gives the following final detailed statement of his theory: 
“(FT3) A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without 
violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, employs her 
reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it towards what threatens 
them, such that the worse parts of her life cause better parts towards its end by a 
process that makes for a compelling and ideally original life-story: in addition, 
the meaning in a human person’s life is reduced, the more it is negatively 
oriented towards fundamental conditions of human existence or exhibits 
narrative disvalue.”29 
Even this more detailed statement of the theory does not indicate any 
troublesome multi-dimensionality or non-linearity. There is no threat of a lack of 
transitivity and orthodox ideas of measurement and ranking seem secure in the 
case of the meanings of lives (and their parts). However, if the remarks in this 
section are correct, one would have to modify Metz’ view in the relevant ways.  
                                                     
29 Metz 2013, 235. 
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4. Conclusion: How then to Think about the Meaning of Life? 
 
There are thus two basic limitations to the possibility of ranking lives with 
respect to meaning: one from indeterminacy (section 1) and one from failure of 
transitivity (section 2). What are the implications of all this for the way we can 
or should think about the meaning of life?  
It is not ruled out in principle by anything said so far that there could still be 
one maximally meaningful life or one group of lives each of which is more 
meaningful than any life not in that group. However, one should be skeptical of 
such an idea and of the idea that this could be the case. Couldn’t there always be 
indeterminacy or a cycle of non-transitivity even among the most meaningful 
lives? It thus seems like a good idea to give up on the idea of “maximizing 
meaning”. There simply might not be such a thing as a maximum here. Metz, 
however, seems to accept the idea of a maximum, for instance when he talks 
about “the most degree of meaning”.30  
However, if the idea of maximizing meaning is as problematic as I am 
suggesting here, then we should rather take a leaf out of the book of satisficing 
views.31 What matters is whether a given life is meaningful, that is, passes the 
(vague) threshold between meaning and the lack thereof. Enough is enough, and 
also good enough. The idea of getting more and ever more out of life or the idea 
of get the most meaning into and out of it are misleading and seriously 
unrealistic. If acknowledging this makes for modesty, then we are better and best 
off with such modesty.   
Metz points out, again and again, that the notion of a meaningful life is an 
evaluative one.32 Different basic axiological views lead to different views about 
meaning then. I propose to give up on certain ideas implicit or explicit in Metz’ 
account: ideas of strict measurement, unrestricted comparability, additive 
aggregation, and global rankings. But this does not mean that one would have to 
give up on Metz’ account of meaning as a whole. On the contrary, I would 
propose to modify the view in the relevant ways in order to make it even 
stronger.  
 
                                                     
30 Metz 2013, 158. 
31 See in general: Simon 1983; Slote 1989; Schwartz 2004. 
32 Metz 2013, 6, passim. 
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